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Case No. 20080772-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
State of Utah,
Plaintiff/ Appellee,
vs.

Tina Harding,
Defendant/ Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from convictions for possession of methamphetamine, a
second degree felony, and possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person,
a third degree felony. This Court has jurisdiction under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-4103(2)(e) (West Supp. 2008-2009).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Did the traffic stop de-escalate to a level one voluntary encounter before
Officer Westerman obtained the driver's consent to search?
2. Did Officer Westerman reasonably believe the driver's consent to search
the vehicle included two backpacks stowed in a compartment behind the back seat?
Standard of Review. The factual findings underlying a trial court's decision to
grant or deny a motion to suppress are reviewed for clear error. State v. Krukowski,
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2004 UT 94, 1f 11,100 P.3d 1222. The trial court's legal conclusions are reviewed
non-deferentially for correctness, including its application of the legal standard to
the facts. State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, ]f 15,103 P.3d 699.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, A N D RULES
U.S. CONST. Amend IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Charge. Defendant was charged with possession of methamphetamine in a
drug-free zone, a second degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-378(2)(a)(i) (West 2004 & Supp. 2008-2009); possession of a dangerous weapon by a
restricted person, a third degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10503(2) (b) (West 2004); false information to a peace officer, a class A misdemeanor, in
violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-507(2) (West 2004); and possession of
paraphernalia in a drug-free zone, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH
CODE A N N .

§58-37a-5a (West 2004 & Supp. 2008-2009). R2-1.

Motion to suppress denied. Defendant, a passenger in a vehicle stopped for
a traffic violation, moved to suppress contraband seized pursuant to the driver's

2
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consent to search the vehicle. R39-35. The trial court denied the motion in a written
Memorandum Decision. R77-69 (a copy is attached).
Conditional guilty plea. Pursuant to a plea bargain agreement, defendant
pled guilty to felony drug and weapons charges with the condition that she could
challenge the trial court's ruling on appeal; the misdemeanor charges were
dismissed. See R95-87; see also R98-97 and R105-04.
Sentence. The trial court imposed the statutory indeterminate terms of one to
fifteen years for the second degree felony, and zero to five years for the third degree
felony. R103. The trial court then suspended imposition of the prison terms and
placed defendant on probation for thirty-six months. R101.
Timely notice of appeal. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. R106.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 1
1. On February 22, 2008, Officer Jeffery Westerman initiated a traffic
stop on a vehicle for an inoperable plate lamp. The stop occurred at
approximately 9:30 p.m.
2. Upon running a routine check on the driver, Officer Westerman
discovered that the driver's license had been denied.
3. To ascertain whether or not there was a licensed driver who could
drive the vehicle from the scene, Officer Westerman requested the

1

The facts are set forth in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling.
See State v. Tetmyer, 947 P.2d 1157,1158 (Utah App. 1997).
3
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names and dates of birth for each of the passengers and discovered that
none of the passengers had a valid license. [2]
4. Officer Westerman asked the driver to exit the vehicle and issued a
citation for an inoperable plate lamp and the denied driver's license.
5. Officer Westerman allowed the driver to contact someone to get the
vehicle and told the driver she was free to leave.
6. The driver then came back with an additional question or comment.
At that point Officer Westerman requested permission to look in the
vehicle and the driver gave consent.
7. A second officer arrived at the scene by the time Officer Westerman
asked the driver to search the vehicle, but was not involved in the
search. [3]
8. During the search of the vehicle, Officer Westerman searched the
defendant's bags.[4] They were located in a storage area directly
behind the seat in which the defendant sat as a passenger in the
vehicle.
9. Before searching the bags, neither [defendant] nor any of the [other]
passengers indicated to whom the bags belonged.
10. Drug paraphernalia, methamphetamine and items identifying
[defendant] as the owner of the bags were found in the bags during the
search.
2

In total, there were three passengers in the car: John Zuran sat in front,
while Josh Kelly and defendant sat in back. R112:5-6.
3

Defendant acknowledged below that the emergency lights on both patrol
cars were turned off before the driver was even asked out of her car. See R58
("Driver was asked to exit her vehicle and prior to her exiting the vehicle both
officerfs] had shut off the emergency lights"), and R57 ("The emergency lights of the
patrol cars were turned off before Driver exited her car").
4

The bags searched were "two backpacks." R112:8.
4
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11. Due to the evidence found in the bags, Officer Westerman arrested
[defendant] and during the search incident to arrest, Officer
Westerman found a blade knife on [defendant's] person.
R76-75. The parties stipulated that the " initial traffic stop was legal/' and that
"defendant ha[d] standing to challenge the search, because she had a legitimate
expectation of privacy in her bags and she never abandoned them." R75.
Based on the above, the trial court concluded that 1) the traffic stop deescalated to a level one voluntary encounter before Officer Westerman obtained the
driver's consent to search the car; and 2) the driver's consent to search included
backpacks stowed behind the backseat. See R72-70.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Point I. The trial court correctly ruled that the traffic stop de-escalated to a
consensual encounter before Officer Westerman obtained the driver's consent to
search; therefore, the driver's consent to search was untainted. The traffic stop deescalated when the officer returned the driver's documents, issued pertinent
citations, and told the driver she was free to leave. After the stop de-escalated to a
consensual encounter, the driver re-approached Officer Westerman and initiated a
conversation, wherein the officer obtained the driver's consent to search. Given the
driver's consent to search, there was necessarily further need to control the scene, so

5
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that the search could be safely conducted. The vehicle occupants were, therefore,
lawfully seized until the search was completed.
Point II. The trial court ruled that defendant showed no possessory or
ownership interest in the vehicle. Accordingly, defendant had no expectation of
privacy in the car itself, and may not challenge the voluntariness of the driver's
consent to search it. However, defendant did have an expectation of privacy in her
personal property in the vehicle and may therefore challenge the search of her
backpacks. That search was lawful because Officer Westerman reasonably believed
that the driver's general consent to search the vehicle included the packs. The
officer's belief was reasonable because (1) the packs were stowed in a compartment
behind the back seat, an area that is typically controlled by the owner/driver, (2)
there was nothing about the packs themselves that suggested they could not belong
to the driver, and (3) the driver did not volunteer that the packs belonged to
defendant. Accordingly, there was no reason for Officer Westerman to believe that
the driver's consent to search did not encompass the packs.
The trial court's ruling denying the motion to suppress should be upheld.

6
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ARGUMENT
I.
THE TRAFFIC STOP DE-ESCALATED TO A CONSENSUAL
ENCOUNTER BEFORE OFFICER WESTERMAN OBTAINED THE
DRIVER'S CONSENT TO SEARCH
In Point 1(A) of her brief, defendant challenges the trial court's ruling that the
traffic stop de-escalated to a level one voluntary encounter before the vehicle was
searched. Aplt. Br. at 9-14. Defendant asserts that absent"reasonable suspicion or
probable cause" the occupants were engaged in criminal activity, "she should have
been allowed to leave the scene while the search of the vehicle took place." Aplt. Br.
at 13-14. Claiming she was illegally detained when her bags were searched,
defendant reasons that all the evidence seized should be suppressed. Aplt. Br. at 14.
Defendant's claim lacks merit and should be rejected.
A. The traffic stop de-escalated to a consensual encounter when
Officer Westerman returned the driver's documents, issued
pertinent citations, and told the driver she was free to go.
A traffic stop constitutes a seizure subject to Fourth Amendment protection.
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,653 (1979); accord State v. Hansen, 2002 UT125,128,
63 P.3d 650. However, the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit all searches and
seizures, but only those that are unreasonable. Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250
(1991). The reasonableness of a traffic stop, like any other seizure, "is judged by

7
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balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its
promotion of legitimate government interests." Prouse, 440 U.S. at 654 (footnote
omitted).
Because "a traffic stop is a limited search and is more like an investigative
detention than a custodial arrest/7 it must satisfy the two-part test established by the
United States Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). State v. Parker, 834
P.2d 592,594 (Utah App. 1992) (citations omitted); accord Hansen, 2002 UT125, \ 29.
First, the stop must be "'justified at its inception/' Hansen, 2002 UT 125, % 29
(citations omitted). Second, the resulting detention must be "'reasonably related in
scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first place.'" Id. The
parties stipulated below that "[t]he initial traffic stop was legal." R75. Thus, the
only question here is whether Officer Westerman's request, and the ensuing vehicle
search, exceeded the scope of the initially lawful traffic stop. As will be shown
below, it did not.
"While a traffic stop may begin as an investigatory detention, it is possible for
it to de-escalate to a consensual encounter." Id. at ]f 37 (case citation omitted).
"Since a consensual encounter is not a seizure, questioning during such an
encounter is lawful, regardless of scope, as long as the person remains a willing

8
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participant/' Id. (case citation omitted). "A traffic stop de-escalates to a consensual
encounter when a reasonable person would believe, based on the totality of the
circumstances, that he or she is free to end the encounter cind depart." Id. at ^f 39
(citations omitted). As recognized in Hansen, "[a]s a threshold matter, an encounter
initiated by a traffic stop may not be deemed consensual unless the driver's
documents have been returned to him, because absent the return of documents, a
person legally could not proceed on is way." Id. at ^f 40 (citations and quotation
marks omitted). Here, as in Hansen, this threshold requirement was met because
Officer Westerman returned the driver's documents before asking for consent to
search the vehicle. Id.) see also R74, 72.
While returning the driver's documents is a threshold factor, "no single factor
is dispositive." Hansen, 2002 UT 125, *[j 41 (citations omitted). Other factors
supporting de-escalation "include informing a person he is free to leave, or that he
does not have to answer additional questions." Id. (citations omitted). Factors
supporting a failure to de-escalate, on the other hand, include "fail[ing] to issue a
warning or citation before engaging in additional questioning," making "a coercive
show of authority," such as having more than one officer present, displaying a

9
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weapon, physically touching the occupants, or using a commanding tone of voice.
Id.
Applying these factors in Hansen, the Utah Supreme Court held that the traffic
stop at issue in that case did not ultimately de-escalate, even though the officer
returned Hansen's documents. Id. at ]f 46. The supreme court observed that Officer
Huntington, who initiated the traffic stop of Hansen, was initially the only officer
present, and that he never made any coercive show of authority. Id. at ]f 43.
However, "[s]ince these factors were never present to begin with, a reasonable
person would not be able to discern a seizure had de-escalated to a consensual
encounter due to the absence of such factors at the time of additional questioning/ 7
Id. Additionally, by the time Officer Huntington engaged in additional questioning
of Hansen,"there was an arguably threatening presence of more than one officer/7
Id. at % 44. A "second patrol car had its lights flashing, and it pulled in behind
Hansen's vehicle/7 Id. Moreover, Officer Huntington did not request to search
Hansen's vehicle until the second officer had exited his patrol car and was standing
next to Officer Huntington's patrol car. Id. Given these circumstances, the supreme
court concluded that "a reasonable person actually may have believed that the
encounter was escalating rather than de-escalating.77 Id.

10
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The supreme court observed that other factors also supported a failure to deescalate in Hansen. Particularly, Officer Huntington told Hansen that he stopped
him for an illegal lane change and because he had no vehicle insurance. Id. at ]f 45.
But when Officer Huntington returned Hansen's documents "he did not address the
illegal lane change before he started questioning Hansen about contraband." Id.
Moreover, Officer Huntington never told Hansen "that he was free to leave or that
he did not have to answer additional questions." Id. Looking at the totality of the
circumstances, the supreme court questioned whether a reasonable person would
have felt free to leave "before being issued a warning or citation, or at least being
told he or she could leave." Id.
Here, in contrast to Hansen, Officer Westerman not only returned the driver's
documents, but also issued pertinent citations, and told the driver she was free to
go. R72. There is no indication in the record that Officer Westerman made a
coercive show of authority by displaying a weapon, physically touching the driver,
or using a commanding tone of voice. While another officer appeared on the scene
during the traffic stop, this factor is alone insufficient to show a failure to deescalate, particularly where, as acknowledged by defendant below, the emergency
lights on both patrol cars were turned off before the driver was even asked out of

11
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her car. See R58-57. Finally, as found by the trial court, Officer Westerman did not
re-approach the driver; rather, after being told she was free to leave, the driver reapproached him and initiated conversation. See R75. It was only after the driver reapproached and initiated conversation with Officer Westerman that he asked her
for —and received —consent to search the vehicle. Id.
In sum, looking at the totality of the circumstances here, the trial court
properly distinguished Hansen and concluded that the traffic stop de-escalated to a
consensual encounter before Officer Westerman obtained the driver's consent to
search. See R75. Because the stop de-escalated to a consensual encounter, neither
Officer Westerman's request for consent to search, nor the vehicle search itself,
exceeded the scope of the detention.
B. After the traffic stop de-escalated to a consensual encounter, the
driver initiated conversation with Officer Westerman and granted
consent to search the car, creating further need to control the
scene.
Since the trial court ruled here, the United States Supreme Court clarified in
Arizona v. Johnson that drivers and passengers are reasonably detained incident to a
traffic stop, "for the duration of the stop," or until "[officers] have no further need to
control the scene, and inform the driver and passengers they are free to leave."

12
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U.S.

, 129 S.Ct. 781, 788 (2009) (citing Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 258

(2007)).
Here, the traffic stop de-escalated to a consensual encounter and the driver
was told that she was free to leave. However, when the driver thereafter initiated
conversation with Officer Westerman and granted consent to search the car, there
necessarily arose "further need to control the scene" until the consensual search
could be safely concluded. Id. Cf. People v. Hoyos, 162 P.3d 528, 546 (Cal. 2007)
(upholding detention of driver and passenger reasonably seized following
Mimms/Wilson order to exit vehicle "at least as long as reasonably necessary for the
officer to complete the activity [an inventory search] the Mimms/Wilson order
contemplates). Johnson did not involve a consensual vehicle search as here, but
safety concerns arise any time an officer is authorized to search a vehicle, whether
the search is justified by probable cause or consent. Accordingly, where as here, a
vehicle search is authorized by the driver's consent, there is "further need to control
the scene." Johnson. 129 S.Ct. at 788. Any other rule would unnecessarily
jeopardize officer safety. The Fourth Amendment does not require this. See, e.g.,
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110 (1977) (recognizing "too plain for
argument" public interest in officer safety "both legitimate and weighty").

13
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Accordingly, the driver and her passengers, including defendant, were lawfully
detained during the consensual vehicle search.
II.
OFFICER WESTERMAN REASONABLY BELIEVED THE
DRIVER'S CONSENT AUTHORITY EXTENDED TO BACKPACKS
STOWED IN A COMPARTMENT BEHIND THE BACK SEAT
In Point I(B)-(C) of her brief, defendant asserts that the (1) driver's consent to
search the vehicle was tainted by the alleged illegal detention, and (2) did not
reasonably include the backpacks stowed in an area behind the back seat. Aplt. Br.
at 14-25. Defendant's claims lack merit.
A. Defendant had no expectation of privacy in the car itself and
cannot therefore challenge the voluntariness of the driver's
consent to search it.
Fourth Amendment rights are personal in nature and may not be vicariously
asserted. State v. Earl, 2004 UT App 163, 110, 92 P.3d 167; State v. Sepulveda, 842
P.2d 913,915 (Utah App. 1992). A defendant may not invoke the exclusionary rule,
even where an unreasonable search has occurred, unless she has a "legitimate
expectation of privacy in the invaded place." Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143
(1978). "A person who is aggrieved by an illegal search . . . of a third person's
premises or property has not had any of his Fourth Amendment rights infringed."
Id. at 134. "Furthermore, '[o]nce the defendant has been put on notice that the state

14
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claims the warrantless search was constitutional because [the defendant] has no
expectation of privacy in the area searched, then the defendant must factually
demonstrate" that he does, in fact, have a legitimate expectation of privacy.
Sepulveda, 842 P.2d at 915 (quoting State v. Marshall 791 R2d 880, 887 (Utah App.
1990) (alterations in original). This expectation of privacy is sometimes called
"Fourth Amendment standing." 5
Here, the prosecutor conceded that defendant could "challenge the search
because she has a shown a legitimate expectation of privacy in her bags that were
searched during the traffic stop." R48 (emphasis added),. Accordingly, the trial
court found that "defendant has standing to challenge the search, because she had a
legitimate expectation of privacy in her bags and she never abandoned them." R75;
see also R74 (citing State v. Bissegger, 2003 UT App 256, 76 P.3d 178). The trial court
clarified, however, that defendant had no "possessory or ownership interest in the
vehicle — she was just a passenger." R71. Therefore, defendant cannot challenge the
voluntariness of the driver's consent to search the car, or Officer Westerman's entry
of the car. See State v. Prows, 2007 UT App 409, ^ 22,178 P.3d 908 (holding Prows, a
passenger, had no standing to challenge the vehicle owner's consent to search);
5

For a discussion of the theoretical interplay between traditional principles of
standing and substantive Fourth Amendment rights, see Rakas, 439 US. at 138-140.
15
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Bissegger, 2003 UT App 256, ^f 8 (recognizing "a car passenger does not normally
have standing to object to a search of the car absent an ownership or possessory
interest in the car") (citing Rakas, 439 U.S. at 148-49); see also Wayne R. LaFave, Search
& Seizure, § 11.3(e) at 196-97 (4th ed. 2004) (recognizing post-Rates, "it is doubtful" a
mere passenger can establish "an expectation [of privacy] anywhere in the vehicle").
Because defendant lacks 4th amendment standing to challenge the search of the
vehicle — as opposed to the backpacks — the State does not address her challenge to
the voluntariness of the driver's consent to search the vehicle.6
B.

Defendant had an expectation of privacy in her backpacks and
may therefore challenge their search, or the reasonableness of
Officer Westerman's belief that the driver's consent to search the
car included the packs.
While defendant cannot challenge the voluntariness of the driver's consent to

search the car, the State agrees that defendant had an expectation of privacy in her
personal property found therein. Accordingly, defendant can challenge whether
Officer Westerman reasonably believed the driver's authority to consent extended to
the two packs stowed in the rear storage compartment.

6

Even if defendant had a possessory or ownership interest in the car, her
challenge to the voluntariness of the driver's consent to search would still fail. As
shown in Point 1(A), the stop de-escalated to a consensual encounter before Officer
Westerman obtained the driver's consent; thus, the consent was not tainted.
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A warrantless—but consensual — search is reasonable. Florida v. Jimeno, 500
U.S. 248, 250-252 (1991). Moreover, it is reasonable, not only if the defendant
consents to the search, but also if a person other than the defendant, with authority
over the premises, consents to the search. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164,170
(1974); see also State v. Messer, 2007 UT App 166, | 21,164 P.3d 421 ("If a third party
rather than the defendant consents to a search, the third party must be one who
possesses 'common authority7 over the area or has some other 'sufficient
relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected") (quotation marks and
citation omitted). Finally, a consensual "search is valid even in instances where the
third party does not possess common authority, as long as [officers]' reasonably
believe[ ]' that the third party possesses such authority." Id. (quoting Illinois v.
Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177,189 (1990)).
Here, defendant does not dispute that the driver had authority to consent to a
search of the car itself. Rather, defendant challenges only the trial court's conclusion
that "the driver had the authority to consent to the search of [defendant's] property
which was located in the vehicle." Aplt. Br. at 24. This Court upheld a similar
search in Messer, 2007 UT App 166, ^ 21, where officers found meth lab equipment
in the trunk of a car. Specifically, Messer challenged the search of the car that was
parked on a third-party's property. Id. at ^f 20. Messer asserted that the third
17
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party's authority to consent to the search did not extend to bags in the trunk. Id.
This Court disagreed, holding that, as custodian of the car, the third party had at
least common authority over the trunk. Id. at ]f 21. Moreover, the trunk search was
valid, even if the third party did not in fact possess common authority over the
trunk, because officers reasonably believed the third party possessed common
authority over it. Id.

Applying Messer here, it was reasonable for Officer

Westerman to believe that the driver had authority to consent to the search of the
backpacks: They were found in the storage area behind the back seat, an area, not
unlike a trunk, which is typically controlled by the owner/driver, and there was
nothing about the packs (like an identification tag) that suggested they could not
belong to the driver. Accordingly, Officer Westerman reasonably believed that the
driver had authority to consent to the search of the packs. See United States v.
Hammons, 152 F.3d 1025,1028 (8th Cir. 1998) (officer reasonably believed garment
bag in trunk belonged to Hammons' wife, who consented to vehicle search, where
officer testified he did not see airline identification tag on bag); State v. Sawyer, 784
A.2d 1208, 1212-13 (N.H. 2001) (officer reasonably believed bag belonged to
consenting driver where bag like those used "to hold tape cassettes and compact
discs" and "was not of a type that, on its face, could not reasonably have been
believed to belong to [driver]"); State v. Maristany, 627 A.2d 1066,1070 (N.J. 1993)
18
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(trooper reasonably believed driver had authority to consent to search of luggage in
trunk where "there was nothing to alert [him] that both, none, or only one of the
bags belonged to [driver]. Neither bag contained identification," "type of luggage, a
canvas gym bag and a suitcase, did not compel the conclusion that one bag
belonged to each of the occupants"). This is particularly true where the driver did
not volunteer that the packs belonged to defendant. See United States v. Navarro, 169
F.3d 228,232 (5th Cir. 1999) (search of luggage in plain view on back seat pursuant
to driver's consent to search vehicle reasonable, where driver did not tell officer
luggage belonged to passenger). And defendant did not claim the packs or
otherwise object to their search. Id. (noting Navarro did not object to the luggage
search); see also Maristany, 627 A.2d at 1070 (noting Maristany did not claim
ownership of gym bag).7 Accordingly, the trial court correctly ruled that "officer
Westerman had no way of knowing whose bags they were; he just proceeded to

7

None of the above cases turns on whether the defendant/ passenger
overheard the officer obtain the driver's consent to search. Because the record is
unclear whether the passengers here overheard Officer Westerman's conversation
with the driver, the State does not rely on cases where the passenger/defendant's
knowledge of the driver's consent was deemed pivotal. See, e.g., State v. Franks, 650
N.W.2d 213,215, 219 (Minn. App. 2002) (holding "no factual basis for a finding of
apparent authority of the driver to consent to the search of [Frank's] suitcase" found
in trunk, where officer asked for driver's consent to search vehicle " [o]ut of [Frank's]
hearing").
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search the contents of the vehicle." R70. While it may be "better law enforcement
practice . . . for police officers to specifically inquire and attempt to ascertain
ownership of luggage in a vehicle with several occupants, rather than to rely on the
driver's consent to search," the Fourth Amendment does not require it. See United
States v. Crain, 33 F.3d 480, 484 (5th Cir. 1994) (observing officers "do not have to
separately request permission to search each closed container in a vehicle, and a
driver's general consent to a search of the car includes consent to examine a paper
bag on the floor"). "The validity of the search does not depend on whether the
[officer] used the best procedure, but rather on whether the officer's conduct was
objectively reasonable under the circumstances." Maristany, 627 A.2d at 1070.
Finally, defendant asserts that because Officer Westerman did not tell the
driver what he was looking for, the ensuing search necessarily exceeded the
scope of the driver's consent. See Aplt. Br. at 24. While "[t]he scope of consent is
usually defined by its expressed object," ]imeno, 500 U.S. at 251, the Fourth
Amendment does not require an officer to identify the object of his search, or to
reveal why he is requesting consent to search. Rather, "[t]he standard for
measuring the scope of a suspect's consent under the Fourth Amendment is that
of 'objective' reasonableness —what would the typical reasonable person have
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understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect?" Id.; accord
State v. Castner, 825 P.2d 699 (Utah App. 1992). Moreover, r/[w]hile a suspect
may limit the scope of the search to which he or she has consented, 'if [that]
consent would reasonably be understood to extend to a particular container, the
Fourth Amendment provides no grounds for requiring a more explicit
authorization." Castner, 825 P.2d at 705 (quoting Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 252)
(additional case citation omitted); accord United States v. Melgar, 227 F.3d 1038,
1041 (7th Cir. 2000) (recognizing general rule, "consent to search a space includes
consent to search containers within that space where a reasonable officer would
construe the consent to extend to the container").
Here, Officer Westerman did not tell the driver why he wanted to search the
car, but it was obvious that he was looking for contraband, and any reasonable
person would have so understood. Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251; see also Grain, 33 F.3d at
484 (discussing Jimeno and rejecting passenger's claim that because "officers never
stated, or even implied, what they were looking for in the car," driver's general
consent to search could not have reasonably included closed paper bag shoved
under seat). Moreover, an objectively reasonable person would have further
understood that contraband could be hidden in the car itself, as well as inside the
packs stowed in the rear storage area. Id.
21
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In sum, Officer Westerman reasonably believed that the driver's consent to
search the vehicle included the two backpacks. The packs were stowed in a
compartment behind the back seat (an area typically controlled by the
owner/driver), there was nothing about the packs themselves that suggested they
could not belong to the driver, and the driver did not volunteer that the packs
belonged to defendant. Finally, it was obvious that the officer was looking for
contraband and that contraband could be hidden not only in the vehicle itself, but
also inside containers found therein. Given the totality of these circumstances, the
trial court correctly ruled that the backpacks "were within the scope of the consent
given to search the vehicle/7 or that Officer Westerman reasonably believed that the
driver's general consent to search the vehicle included the backpacks in the rear
storage compartment. R70.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted 22 June 2009.
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Addendum

J

W 1 S 2008
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION
TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE

Plaintiff,
Case No. 081400645
vs.
Judge Claudia Laycock
TINA MARIE HARDING,
June 12,2008
Defendant.
This matter came before the court for oral arguments on the defendant's Motion to
Suppress on June 4, 2008. The plaintiff, State of Utah, was represented by its attorney, Craig R.
Johnson, The defendant appeared in custody of the Utah County Sheriff and was represented by
Barbara A. Gonzales. Having reviewed the file, the transcript of the preliminary hearing, the
memoranda presented by both parties, and the oral arguments made by the parties, the court issues
the following:
I. PROCEDUAL HISTORY
1. On March 19, 2008, during the preliminary hearing, the court bound over the defendant
for trial on 1) illegal possession or use of a controlled substance, 2) possession or use of a
dangerous weapon by a restricted person, 3) false information to a police officer, and 4)
use or possession of drug paraphernalia.
2. The defendant filed her Motion to Suppress and Memorandum in Support of her Motion to
Suppress on April 25, 2008.
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3. On May 2, 2008, the State filed its Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to
Suppress.
4. On May 28, 2008, the court requested additional pleadings addressing State v. Hansen, 63
P.3d 650 (Utah 2002).
5. The defense filed her additional memorandum on June 2, 2008 and the State filed its
additional memorandum on June 3, 2008.
6. The court heard oral arguments on June 4, 2008 and took the matter under advisement.

II. FINDINGS OF FACT
1. On February 22, 2008, Officer Jeffery Westerman initiated a traffic stop on a vehicle for
an inoperable plate lamp. The stop occurred at approximately 9:30 p.m.
2. Upon running a routine check on the driver, Officer Westerman discovered that the
driver's license had been denied.
3. To ascertain whether or not there was a licensed driver who could drive the vehicle from
the scene, Officer Westerman requested the names and dates of birth for each of the
passengers and discovered that none of the passengers had a valid license.
4. Officer Westerman asked the driver to exit the vehicle and issued a citation for an
inoperable plate lamp and the denied driver's license.
5. Officer Westerman allowed the driver to contact someone to get the vehicle and told the
driver that she was free to leave.
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6. The driver then came back with an additional question or comment. At that point Officer
Westerman requested permission to look in the vehicle and the driver gave consent.
7. A second officer arrived at the scene by the time Officer Westerman asked the driver to
search the vehicle, but was not involved in the search.
8. During the search of the vehicle, Officer Westerman searched the defendant's bags. They
were located in a storage area directly behind the seat in which the defendant sat as a
passenger in the vehicle.
9. Before searching the bags, neither Ms. Harding nor any of the other passengers indicated
to whom the bags belonged.
10. Drug paraphernalia, methamphetamine and items identifying Ms. Harding as the owner
of the bags were found in the bags during the search.
11. Due to the evidence found in the bags, Officer Westerman arrested Ms. Harding and
during the search incident to arrest, Officer Westerman found a blade knife on Ms.
Harding's person.
II. PARTIES'STIPULATIONS
12. The initial traffic stop was legal.
13. The defendant has standing to challenge the search, because she had a legitimate
expectation of privacy in her bags and she never abandoned them.
III. DISCUSSION
The parties have stipulated to two important issues that the court would normally have to
determine in a case such as this. First, the defense acknowledged and the court finds that the traffic
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stop conducted by Officer Westerman was justified at its inception. Second, the State has
acknowledged and the court finds that Ms. Harding has standing to challenge the constitutionality
of the vehicle search because she had a reasonable expectation to privacy in her bags and she never
abandoned them. In State v. Bissegger, 16 P.3d 178 (Utah App. 2003), the trial court denied the
motion to suppress because it determined that the defendant lacked standing. The Bissegger court
overturned that ruling, concluding that the defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in her
belongings and that she never abandoned them. Unlike Bissegger, in the case before the Court
here, standing and abandonment are not disputed.
But similar to Bissegger, the Court must now determine whether the search of the vehicle
conducted by Officer Westerman was lawful. To determine this, the Court must ask three
questions. First, was Officer Westerman's action in stopping the vehicle justified at its inception?
Second, did the search of the vehicle exceed the scope of the detention? And third, were Ms.
Harding's bags within the scope of the consent to search the vehicle? As noted above, both parties
agree that the answer to the first question is yes: the initial stop was lawful. Thus, the court is left to
determine whether the search exceeded the scope of the detention and whether Ms. Harding's bags
were within the scope of the consent to search the vehicle.

A.

DID THE SEARCH OF THE VEHICLE EXCEED THE SCOPE OF THE
DETENTION?
In general an officer must have a warrant to search a vehicle, but one of the exceptions to

the warrant requirement is voluntary consent of the vehicle owner. See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d
1201, 1217-18 (Utah 1993). Here, it is undisputed that Officer Westerman obtained the consent of
the driver before searching the vehicle. However, as seen in both Bissegger and State v. Hansen,
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63 P.3d 650 (Utah 2002), a search may be illegal even with consent if the search exceeds the scope
of the detention. In both of those cases, the consent obtained was not valid because the traffic stop
had not de-escalated to a consensual encounter. Similarly, Officer Westerman's search of the
vehicle would be legal only if he had obtained consent after the encounter had de-escalated to a
consensual encounter.
Hansen sets out an excellent roadmap of analysis to determine whether an encounter has
de-escalated or not. The general rule is that "a traffic stop de-escalates to a consensual encounter
when a reasonable person would believe, based on the totality of the circumstances, that he or she
is free to.. .depart." Id at 661. As a threshold matter "a stop may not be consensual unless the
driver's documents have been returned to him." Id, But, when the facts of a case pass this threshold
matter (as it did in Hansen and as it does in the case before the court), the court must look to other
factors to determine whether a traffic stop has de-escalated. As set out in Hansen, "informing a
person he is free to leave, or that he does not have to answer additional questions" weighs in favor
of de-escalation. Id. But a "coercive show of authority, such as the presence of more than one
officer, the display of a weapon, physical touching by the officer, or his use of a commanding tone
of voice" weighs against de-escalation. Id at 662. The Hansen court explained that, under the facts
of that case, a reasonable person would not think the encounter at issue in the case had
de-escalated; in fact, a reasonable person could believe that the encounter had escalated. Id. First,
the factual differences between the initial stop and the additional questioning were minimal in that
the show of force by the questioning officer had not materially changed. Id. Second, at the time of
the additional questioning, a second patrol car with its lights on arrived on the scene, which could
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have made a reasonable person believe the encounter was escalating, not de-escalating. Finally,
the officer never told the driver he was free to leave and began the additional questioning before
issuing a citation or addressing the alleged violation. Id.
Unlike Hansen, the traffic stop in this matter had de-escalated to a consensual encounter
before Officer Westerman asked for consent to search the vehicle. Before Asking for consent,
Officer Westerman had returned all the driver's documents and had given her a citation for the
traffic violations, indicating she was free to leave. A reasonable person would have known she was
free to leave. The second officer was already present before the driver was asked for her consent to
search the vehicle, so a reasonable person would not have thought the encounter had escalated, as
was the case in Hansen. Finally, the driver voluntarily came back to the officer with an additional
comment or question—initiating further conversation herself. It was during this conversation, not
before, that Officer Westerman asked for consent to search the vehicle. Unlike Hansen, a
reasonable person would have felt free to leave under the circumstances in this case. The court
concludes that the stop had de-escalated before consent was given and, therefore, the search of the
vehicle did not exceed the scope of the detention.
The defense argues that, while the driver may have felt free to leave before consenting to
search the vehicle, Ms. Harding, as a passenger inside the vehicle during the conversations
between Officer Westerman and the driver, did not feel free to leave. The court, however, sees no
need to rule as to whether or not Ms. Harding felt free to leave because the question is irrelevant
under these circumstances. As explained in Biggegger, "a car passenger does not normally have
standing to object to a search of the car absent an ownership or possessory interest in the car." 76
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P.3d at 181. Nowhere m record is there any indication that Ms. Harding had either a possessory or
ownership interest in the vehicle—she was just a passenger. It is true that she has standing to
challenge the search because she owned the bags that Officer Westerman ultimately searched, but
since Officer Westerman lawfully received consent from the only person in the vehicle who had a
possessory or ownership interest in the vehicle, the search of the vehicle was lawful. To rule
otherwise would require an officer to gain consent from every passenger before searching a
vehicle (because each passenger may have personal belongings in the vehicle) and to individually
tell each passenger that he or she was free to leave. The case law does not support that conclusion.
Thus, regardless of whether Ms. Harding reasonably felt free to leave or not, Officer Westerman's
search was proper because the traffic stop had already de-escalated, Officer Westerman received
consent from the driver, and, therefore, the search did not exceed the scope of the detention.
B.

WERE MS. HARDING'S BAGS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE CONSENT TO
SEARCH THE VEHICLE?
It is undisputed that Ms. Harding preserved a legitimate expectation of privacy in her bags

because she never abandoned them. However, whether or not Ms. Harding had a legitimate
expectation of privacy becomes irrelevant if Officer Westerman's search of the bags was legal.
The court directs the parties' attention to Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (1991). In Jimeno, an
officer gained consent to search a vehicle in which the driver and his wife were occupants. Id at
249-50. After the passenger stepped out of the vehicle, the officer found a brown paper bag on the
passenger floorboard with cocaine inside. Id at 250. The United States Supreme Court overturned
the Florida Supreme Court's ruling that a general consent to search a vehicle did not extent to a
closed bag on the floorboard. Id. The Supreme Court explained, "[I]f [the driver's] consent would
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reasonably be understood to extend to a particular container, the Fourth Amendment provides no
grounds for requiring a more explicit authorization." Wat 252. It further explained, "We think that
it was objectively reasonable for the police to conclude that the general consent to search
respondents' car included consent to search containers within that car which might bear drugs." Id
at 251. Clearly, then, the standard for determining whether Officer Westerman's search of the bags
was within the scope of the consent is whether it was objectively reasonable for the officer to
conclude that the bags were part of the consent given. The court concludes that it was.
There is no indication in the record that Ms. Harding objected to the search of her bags or
attempted to take those bags with her when she exited the vehicle. Given those circumstances,
Officer Westerman had no way of knowing whose bags they were; he just proceeded to search the
contents of the vehicle. As the Supreme Court explained in Jimeno, it is objectionably reasonable
for an officer to search a container "which might bear drugs." Id. Bags in a vehicle could certainly
contain drugs, so Officer Westerman's search of Ms. Harding's bags was objectively reasonable.
Thus, Ms. Harding's bags were not beyond the scope of the consent given to search the vehicle.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based upon the above, Officer Westerman's action was justified in its inception, the search
did not exceed the scope of the detention, and Ms. Harding's bags were within the scope of the
consent given to search the vehicle. Therefore, the court denies the defendant's motion to suppress.
The State shall prepare the appropriate findings, conclusions, and order and submit them for the
court's signature.
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DATED this J2ji*day of June, 2008.

Mil
Hoftbrabte Claudj^a^dk
FourtlteDikrict CdiirtiiSge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that, on the
day of June 2008,1 caused a true and correct copy of
the foregoing RULING ON PROPOSED MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER:
REGARDING SUBPOENAS to be delivered to the following parties:
Barbara A. Gonzales
Utah County Public Defender Association
Attorneys for Defendant
51 South University Avenue, Suite 206
Provo, Utah 84601
Craig R. Johnson
Utah County Attorney's Office
100 East Center Street, Suite 2100
Provo, Utah 84606
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